On Virtue – Part I
What it Means to Be Human – Inclination to the Good
As we begin to look at virtue it will be necessary that we understand the distinction between acquired and infused virtue. Even as we first worked together to understand conscience, a basic question arose that was briefly addressed, even as it was not explicitly asked. It is a question that should come to mind early as we progress in faith seeking understanding. The question I’m thinking of is the question of how these things apply to unbelievers as well as believers. In our discussion of conscience, the knowing and doing of the true and the good and avoiding the doing of evil, should have asked the question of how it is that unbelievers (un-graced) can do good and avoid evil, yet we have considered that ultimately doing good and avoiding evil[i] requires Sanctifying Grace, given to believers. Human dignity and common good are the foundational measure of the morality of a human act. What we do as human beings, our actions, ought to be beneficial to our self and/or beneficial to the common good. Now, because I say “and/or” we must consider that an act can be beneficial to the common good and not be beneficial to the person acting.
In the philosophy of personalism, as developed by St John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla) it has as its central premise what the Saint calls the Law of the Gift. The moral quality of a human act increases in relation to the giving of the self for the sake of another, or for community. If an act is totally for the benefit of the person acting, with a deficiency of benefit or neglect of care of another, the act has minimal, if any, moral quality and would be immoral if it causes harm to the other. This is not to say that self-improvement is acting selfishly; practicing good health, exercise, study, leisure and the like are all good in themselves, if they do not cause a burden or neglect of persons or responsibilities in our life.[ii]
The concept of the law of the gift will immediately come into contrast with the world view of individualism and personal freedom that has been instilled in the western human psyche since the 17th century and the subsequent development of “enlightenment,” modern, and post-modern philosophy. Without any excursion into modern philosophy, you, the reader will know or have a sense of the contrast presented here; i.e. the law of the gift vs. enlightenment individualism. If you have never heard of enlightenment philosophy, you would still have a sense of hesitation in considering the law of the gift in the sense that it encourages human acts that may be harmful to the person acting in order for them to be beneficial to another person or the community. Pause for a moment and see if this may or may not seem to you to be a contrasting perspective. ~ ~ ~ Earlier in our time together, in our consideration of conscience, we presented two similar yet drastically different axioms: Do good and avoid evil, on the one hand, and Seek pleasure and avoid suffering on the other. If I (a western adult human) am considering an act that would be beneficial to others, even one other person, but knowing that this act has unbeneficial or even harmful consequences to me, how does that affect my decision to go through with the act. The answer to this rhetorical question depends on which of these two axioms you adhere to. These ideas are a consideration of virtue, both acquired and infused.
The truth is that either form of virtue would adhere to the former axiom and the law of the gift, rather than the latter enlightenment variation. Still yet, before we consider the distinction of the two forms of virtue, we must preface our study with four basic concepts of what it means to be human. Humans, as rational beings, have inclinations that, because of our rational nature, are very distinct from otherwise animal instincts. Instincts are what cause animated creatures to react to a stimulus. 
Animated creatures being the higher form of the three categories of creature; inanimate, vegetative, and animate; the higher of these being distinguished by its ability to move about of its own initiative. Although plants do move and react to the world around them, growing, turning toward the sun, and forming as influenced by the wind; plants, for the most part, are rooted and cannot change their location; they have no locomotion. Creatures such as us humans and animals, on the other hand, most certainly are mobile. These, therefore, are the basic three categories of creatures. For the sake of our consideration of virtue we will focus on humans as opposed to animals; inclination as opposed to instinct.
I would not deny that humans have instincts, but because we also are rational, able to consider the consequences of our actions (among other things,) we are “one up” on the animals who merely react to stimuli. With this in mind, let’s consider four basic inclinations of human nature; some of which you will recognize as indistinguishable from animal instincts, but on further review you will see a distinction. First is the inclination to self-preservation. To continue in existence, avoiding dangers or opposition that may cause the end of our existence, or even in a lesser form, cause us harm. Avoiding harm to self, faced with any threat, falls under this first inclination, which we share with non-rational animals (henceforth referred to simply as animals.) The second inclination is that of continuance of species; or procreation, the having of offspring, which we also share with animals. The third inclination is to live in harmony with others, primarily other human beings, but secondarily in harmony with animals and creation itself; in so far as harmony with non-humans means a non-abusive relation. For the sake of considering human inclinations as it leads us to understand virtue, we will consider this third inclination in relation to other human beings; which means the third inclination is to live peacefully in community. Again this would parallel the instinct of animals to live together with their own species. In regards to virtue we are referring to humans rather than animals. Now this insistence comes just in time for the fourth inclination which is the inclination to seek truth; truth in particular is what distinguishes human inclinations from animal instincts.
I would not deny that humans have instincts, but because we also are rational, able to consider the consequences of our actions (among other things,) we are “one up” on the animals who merely react to stimuli. With this in mind, let’s consider four basic inclinations of human nature; some of which you will recognize as indistinguishable from animal instincts, but on further review you will see a distinction. First is the inclination to self-preservation. To continue in existence, avoiding dangers or opposition that may cause the end of our existence, or even in a lesser form, cause us harm. Avoiding harm to self, faced with any threat, falls under this first inclination, which we share with non-rational animals (henceforth referred to simply as animals.) The second inclination is that of continuance of species; or procreation, the having of offspring, which we also share with animals. The third inclination is to live in harmony with others, primarily other human beings, but secondarily in harmony with animals and creation itself; in so far as harmony with non-humans means a non-abusive relation. For the sake of considering human inclinations as it leads us to understand virtue, we will consider this third inclination in relation to other human beings; which means the third inclination is to live peacefully in community. Again this would parallel the instinct of animals to live together with their own species. In regards to virtue we are referring to humans rather than animals. Now this insistence comes just in time for the fourth inclination which is the inclination to seek truth; truth in particular is what distinguishes human inclinations from animal instincts.
If we put these in a more concise list of the four we would have, (1) Self-preservation, (2) Procreation, (3) Communal life, and (4) desire for truth. These four inclinations are inherent in every human being, and they constitute an overarching natural inclination to what is good. To see how these relate to virtue, we have to first consider these four in relation to each other. As listed here they are numbered in a lower-to-higher quality of good; but only so because they are of a rational nature, human nature. As the first three are also found in animals, they would be of most importance in the order they are in. To an animal self-preservation is more important than the other two. For human beings, however, having this fourth inclination, the order of
importance is reversed. It is most important to seek truth, and any of the other three can be given up for that highest good. This holds for each inclination as having priority going back up the scale; being
in community can hold a higher priority of good than procreation or self-preservation; although this hierarchical prioritizing is not as linear as that.
For certain the highest good is truth and the seeking of it, but the middle two can only be prioritized situationally. The first, however, self-preservation, humanly speaking, is the least in a prioritized list of quality of good. “No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.” (Jn 15:13)
This prioritizing of inclination to goodness can only be understood properly in relation to virtue, and paradoxically, virtue can only be properly understood in relation to the prioritizing of these human inclinations. What this means is that every human being is naturally motivated to what is good to the degree that this scale of inclinations is appealing to the individual person. The more willing, you might say, for a person to give up a lesser good for a higher good, the more virtuous that person is or properly speaking, the more virtuous a person is the more inclined is the person to give up a lower good for a higher. I think you are already beginning to see specific virtue in this relation of acts to the various goods. We will delineate the virtues in relation to goods, but for now just consider the four inclinations to good and how or what it would take to give up one for another.
In our next time together we will, as I prompted us at the beginning of this essay, consider acquired vs. infused virtue. For now I will say that, although infused virtue has to be acquired, it is only in the sense of being practiced towards perfection. The terms acquired and infused as adjectives to “virtue” refer to their objective rather than their source. As a preview of the next essay and its topic I will conclude by saying that there are seven principle virtues; Faith, Hope, Charity and Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, and Temperance. The first three are called the Theological Virtues and the latter four are called the Cardinal Virtues. As “cardinal” is from a Latin word meaning “hinge,” it means all other human virtues come from or “hinge” from these four; e.g. kindness, generosity, frugality, etc., all virtuous characteristics or virtues in themselves, but all are derivative of the four Cardinal Virtues. Next we will consider how, in relation to their objective (or object,) the original seven may be acquired or infused or both.
[i] Evil, by the way, is a word used in philosophical and theological discussion of moral behavior; and it is used as a term for the opposite of good. In normal conversational use, evil gives the connotation of something sinister or horrible, something diabolical, and this is certainly true in philosophy and theology, but it does not exclude any lesser human act that is not good; meaning true and good, for the wellbeing of the person acting and/or the community that person is a part of. So a given human act is either good or evil, good or bad, good or not good; with obvious gradation, but nothing that can be designated otherwise.
[ii] It must be noted here, in support of this assertion, that some acts are immoral per se, in themselves regardless of circumstance. On the other hand, some acts are neither moral or immoral intrinsically, but are measured in relation to particular circumstances.